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Is God a Mindless Vegetable?  





In the sixteenth century the Stoics were deemed friends of humanist 
Christians, but by the eighteenth century they were attacked as atheists. 
What happened in the intervening period? In the middle of this period falls 
Ralph Cudworth’s True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678), which 
contains a sustained analysis of Stoic theology. In Cudworth’s complex 
taxonomy Stoicism appears twice, both as a form of atheism and an example 
of imperfect theism. Whether the Stoics are theists or atheists hinges on 
whether their God is conscious and intelligent, or alive but unconscious like 
a plant or vegetable. Is God sentient or is he a mindless vegetable? 
 
In the late sixteenth century a number of influential writers claimed 
Stoicism to be compatible with Christianity but by the mid eighteenth 
century Stoicism was associated with atheism. What happened during the 
course of the reception of Stoicism in the intervening period? While it 
remains unclear who was the first person to call the Stoics atheists, there is 
no doubt that the most philosophically sustained analysis of Stoic theology 
during this period is to be found in Ralph Cudworth’s True Intellectual 
System of the Universe, published in 1678. Cudworth’s aim in this work is to 
catalogue and then attack all existing forms of atheism and one of the four 
principal forms of atheism he identifies he calls ‘Stoical’. However, in 
Cudworth’s complex taxonomy of different forms of theism and atheism, 
Stoicism appears twice, first as a form of atheism but also as a form of 
imperfect theism. The aim of this study is to examine Cudworth’s claims 
about Stoic theology, assessing their fairness, but also placing them within 






From Theism to Atheism 
 
In 1598 Thomas James, the first Librarian of the Bodleian and translator of 
the ‘Neostoic’ author Guillaume Du Vair, proclaimed that ‘no kinde of 
philosophie is more profitable and nearer approaching unto Christianitie 
than the philosophie of the Stoicks’.1 In making this claim James was 
following Du Vair who, in turn, was following in the wake of the Belgian 
Humanist Justus Lipsius. Lipsius, in his dialogue De Constantia of 1584, had 
attempted to revive ancient Stoicism in a form that would be palatable to a 
modern Christian audience.2 In order to do so, Lipsius pointed out certain 
parts of the Stoic system – primarily relating to the roles of fate and 
providence – that would need to be amended,3 but by and large Lipsius was 
at one with Bodley’s librarian in proclaiming that Stoicism was not only 
compatible with Christianity, but was in fact the most appropriate 
philosophical system for a Classically-educated Christian to adopt.   
 
By 1765 – just over a century and a half later – Stoicism had undergone a 
dramatic transformation. Far from being the most ‘godly and christianly’4 
philosophy that Lipsius, James, and others had presented to the public in 
the late sixteenth century, Stoicism was now presented by Diderot and 
d’Alembert in their Encyclopédie as a form of materialism, determinism, and 
                                                        
1 Thomas James, ‘Dedicatory Epistle’, prefacing his 1598 translation of Du Vair’s 
Philosophie morale des Stoiques, in G. Du Vair, The Moral Philosophie of the Stoicks, edited by 
R. Kirk, translated by T. James (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1951), 45.  
2 J. Lipsius, De Constantia Libri Duo, Qui alloquium praecipue continent in Publicis malis 
(Leiden, 1584); translated in On Constancy, edited by J. Sellars, translated by J. Stradling 
(Exeter: Bristol Phoenix Press, 2006).  
3 See e.g. Lipsius, De Constantia 1.20.  
4 This phrase comes from James Sanford’s ‘Epistle’ to Queen Elizabeth in his The Manuell 
of Epictetus, Translated out of Greeke into French, and now into English (London, 1567), and is 
used in relation to Epictetus.  
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atheism.5 And they were by no means alone in this assessment, building as 
they were upon the judgements of earlier eighteenth century writers, such 
as the famous German historian of philosophy Jacob Brucker.6  
 
The reasons for this dramatic and unexpected shift in the assessment of 
Stoicism are of course complex. One important strand appears to have been 
a move away from reading the primarily moral works of the late Stoic 
authors Seneca and Epictetus (as Lipsius and Du Vair had done) and 
towards a concern with the fragments of the earlier Stoics such as Zeno 
and Chrysippus. This shift is especially clear in Brucker’s history, which 
warns readers not to be impressed by the apparently noble accounts of 
God, the soul, and other topics in Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius 
without first gaining a proper understanding of the philosophical principles 
that stand behind them. It is only by grasping Stoicism as a philosophical 
system that we shall be able to judge it properly, and we can only do that 
via a patient reconstruction of the doctrines of the early Stoa involving the 
collation of fragments from the doxographical reports of Diogenes 
Laertius, Cicero, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, and others.7 The irony in all                                                         
5 See Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire Raisonné des Sciences, des Arts et des Métiers, 17 vols 
(Neufchastel, 1751-65), vol. 15, 528: ‘Il n’est pas difficile de conclure de ces principes, que 
les stoïciens étoient matérialistes, fatalists, & à proprement parler athées’. 
6 See J. Brucker’s Historia Critica Philosophiae, 6 vols (Leipzig, 1742-7), esp. vol. 1, 893-
967. An abridged translation can be found in W. Enfield, The History of Philosophy […] 
Drawn up From Brucker’s Historia Critica Philosophiae, 2 vols (London, 1819), vol. 1, 315-
51. For further discussion of the reception of Stoicism during this period see especially 
two studies by C. Brooke: ‘Stoicism and Anti-Stoicism in the Seventeenth Century’, in 
Grotius and the Stoa, edited by H. W. Blom and L. C. Winkel, Grotiana 22/23 (Assen: 
Royal Van Gorcum, 2004), 93-115, and ‘How the Stoics Became Atheists’, The Historical 
Journal 49 (2006), 387-402.  
7 See Brucker, Historia Critica Philosophiae, vol. 1, 909 (in the translation of Enfield, vol. 1, 
323): ‘Great care should be taken, in the first place, not to judge of the doctrine of the 
Stoics from words and sentiments, detached from the general system, but to consider 
them as they stand related to the whole train of premises and conclusions. For want of 
this caution, many moderns, dazzled by the splendid expressions which they have met 
with in the writings of the Stoics concerning God, the soul, and other subjects, have 
imagined that they have discovered an invaluable treasure: whereas, if they had taken the 
pains to restore these brilliants to their proper places in the general mass, it would soon 
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this, of course, is that it was Lipsius himself who laid the foundations for 
this shift when he made the first systematic attempt to gather together the 
fragments of the Stoics in a pair of sourcebooks published in 1604 and 
conceived as companion pieces to his edition of Seneca published the 
following year.8  
 
An equally important strand was the way in which Stoicism as a 
philosophical position was often brought into contemporary philosophical 
debates, especially those concerning determinism, fate, and providence. At 
precisely the time that attention was shifting away from the high-minded 
morals of Epictetus and Seneca towards the physical doctrines of the early 
Stoa, the late seventeenth century philosophical scene was coming to terms 
with the works of Hobbes and then Spinoza, who were of course to become 
the two great anti-heroes of the Enlightenment.9 Before long both Hobbes 
and Spinoza were branded ‘Stoics’ by some of their contemporary critics, 
and so the fate of Stoicism became intertwined with the fates of Hobbism 
and (in particular) Spinozism.                                                          
have appeared, that a great part of their value was imaginary’ (expendenda esse verba & 
sententias Stoicorum non extra systematis nexum, sed juncto toto consequentiarum syrmate, quo ex 
principiis semel admissis conclusions derivantur, Accidit enim viris magnis, ut speciosis Stoicorum 
dictis de Deo, de animo, de officiis seducti, nescio quos thesaurus se invenisse putaverint, qui intra 
systematis nexum & ex vero eius sensu considerati carbones exhibebant). Brucker goes on to 
suggest, vol. 1, 911 (in Enfield, vol. 1, 324), that the works of Seneca, Epictetus, and 
Marcus Aurelius are not adequate to illustrate the essential doctrines of Stoicism; to do 
that one must examine the reports in Cicero, Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius, Sextus 
Empiricus, Simplicius, and Stobaeus.  
8 See J. Lipsius, Manuductionis ad Stoicam Philosophiam Libri Tres (Antwerp, 1604) and 
Physiologiae Stoicorum Libri Tres (Antwerp, 1604), with the discussion in J. L. Saunders, 
Justus Lipsius: The Philosophy of Renaissance Stoicism (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 
1955).  
9 On Hobbes and Spinoza in the Enlightenment see e.g. S. I. Mintz, The Hunting of 
Leviathan: Seventeenth-Century Reactions to the Materialism and Moral Philosophy of Thomas 
Hobbes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962) and J. I. Israel, Radical 
Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001) respectively. Note also Samuel Clarke’s contemporary polemic, in 
S. Clarke, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, More Particularly in Answer to 
Mr Hobbs, Spinoza, and their Followers, The Ninth Edition (London, 1738).  
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It is precisely this sort of dialogue between the ancient and the modern 
that marks Ralph Cudworth’s monumental True Intellectual System of the 
Universe (hereafter TIS), published in 1678.10 This work deserves to stand 
alongside Hobbes’s Leviathan and Locke’s Essay as the third great work of 
seventeenth century English philosophy. It has not received that accolade 
as widely as it might, no doubt in part due to its length (900 folio pages), 
but also due to its detailed and extensive (if not laborious and relentless) 
quotation from and discussion of a bewildering array of ancient 
philosophical texts, from the earliest Presocratics through to the last 
Neoplatonists. In his Thoughts Concerning Education, John Locke praised 
TIS as a veritable encyclopaedia of ancient philosophy.11 Cudworth’s later 
editor, Thomas Birch, called the TIS ‘the most valuable treasure of the 
ancient theology and philosophy extant in any language’.12 Against the 
grain of the new emerging style of philosophical writing, Cudworth harks 
                                                        
10 R. Cudworth, The True Intellectual System of the Universe: The First Part, Wherein all the 
Reason and Philosophy of Atheism is Confuted and its Impossibility Demonstrated (London, 
1678). An abridged version by Thomas Wise was published in 1706 and a Latin 
translation with notes by J. L. Mosheim was published in 1733. A second English edition 
by Thomas Birch was published in 1743 and this was reissued in 1820. A new edition in 
1845 included Mosheim’s notes, translated from the Latin by John Harrison. I have 
consulted the 1678 edition, the 1820 edition, and the Thoemmes Press reprint of the 1845 
edition, introduced by G. A. J. Rogers. All references are to ch. and § but I also supply the 
pagination for the first edition of 1678 and the 1820 edition (which is the only edition 
currently in print, via Elibron Classics, 2003), citing both by date.  
11 See J. Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education (London, 1693), in the modern edition 
Some Thoughts Concerning Education, edited by J. W. and J. S. Yolton (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1989), 248: ‘He that would look farther back, and acquaint himself with the several 
Opinions of the Ancients, may consult Dr. Cudworth’s Intellectual System; wherein that very 
learned Author hath with such Accurateness and Judgment collected and explained the 
Opinions of the Greek Philosophers, that what Principles they built on, and what were the 
chief Hypotheses, that divided them, is better to be seen in him, than any where else that I 
know’.  
12 T. Birch, in R. Cudworth, The True Intellectual System of the Universe […] The Second 
Edition [… with] an account of the life and writings of the author by Thomas Birch 
(London, 1743), v.  
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back to the spirit of Renaissance Humanism.13 The TIS was published 
roughly in the middle of the period during which Stoicism was 
transformed from theism to atheism (i.e. 1584-1765). It also contains what 
must be the most sustained discussion of Stoic theology from the early 
modern period. On the journey from theisim to atheism, then, Cudworth’s 
discussion stands as a key moment in the reception of Stoicism.  
 
The True Intellectual System  
 
Before turning to the details of Cudworth’s account of Stoicism it may be 
helpful to have a clearer idea of both his own philosophical outlook and the 
task that he set himself in the TIS. Cudworth was, of course, one of the 
Cambridge Platonists.14 To describe him simply as a Platonist, however, 
does not begin to do justice to the complexities of his philosophy. A more 
accurate label might be Cartesian Neoplatonist, for it is the Neoplatonic 
tradition inaugurated by Plotinus that formed the central influence, 
combined with a commitment to Cartesian dualism.15 Cudworth’s own                                                         
13 By contrast, Hobbes’s Leviathan appears thoroughy modern, with very few explicit 
classical references. However, Q. Skinner, Visions of Politics 3: Hobbes and Civil Science 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), ch. 2, has argued that Hobbes too should 
be seen within the context of Humanism.  
14 For general introductions to Cudworth and/or the Cambridge Platonists see (highly 
selective, and in chronological order): C. E. Lowrey, The Philosophy of Ralph Cudworth: A 
Study of the True Intellectual System of the Universe (New York, 1884); F. J. Powicke, The 
Cambridge Platonists: A Study (London: Dent, 1926); J. H. Muirhead, The Platonic Tradition 
in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931), chs 1-3; J. A. 
Passmore, Ralph Cudworth: An Interpretation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1951); E. Cassirer, The Platonic Renaissance in England, translated by J. P. Pettegrove [a 
translation of Die Platonische Renaissance in England und die Schule von Cambridge first 
published in 1932] (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1953); S. Hutton, ‘Lord Herbert of Cherbury and 
the Cambridge Platonists’, in British Philosophy and the Age of Enlightenment, edited by S. 
Brown, Routledge History of Philosophy Vol. V (London: Routledge, 1996), 20-42; G. A. 
J. Rogers, J. M. Vienne, Y.-C. Zarka (eds.), The Cambridge Platonists in Philosophical Context 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997); S. Hutton, ‘The Cambridge Platonists’, in A Companion to 
Early Modern Philosophy, edited by S. Nadler (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 308-19.  
15 See L. Gysi, Platonism and Cartesianism in the Philosophy of Ralph Cudworth (Bern: 
Herbert Lang, 1962) and D. B. Sailor, ‘Cudworth and Descartes’, Journal of the History of 
Ideas 23 (1962), 133-40.  
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metaphysics comprises God, a mechanical atomistic nature, and, between 
the two, immaterial souls and an unconscious, animate ‘plastic nature’ that 
orders the inert physical world according to God’s providence and 
emanates from Him in a Neoplatonic fashion. For Cudworth mechanical 
atomism need not undermine the immaterial soul or God; on the contrary 
such a philosophy requires such entities in order to explain the movement of 
inanimate matter, either as a first cause or in the form of more regular 
intervention.  
 
As well as a commitment to the existence of God, Cudworth is equally 
committed to the objective existence of moral values and to freedom of the 
will. His philosophy is thus concerned with supporting these three claims 
and, as importantly, attacking their opposites, namely atheism, moral 
relativism, and determinism. Cudworth’s magnum opus, the True Intellectual 
System of the Universe, was conceived in three parts, each concerned with 
one of these key philosophical disputes: theism versus atheism, moral 
objectivism versus relativism, and liberty versus necessity.16 The book that 
was published under the title True Intellectual System in 1678 is, despite its 
length, only the first part of the projected work, and so subtitled The First 
Part Wherein all the Reason and Philosophy of Atheism is Confuted and its 
Impossibility Demonstrated. It was in fact the final part of his project, 
concerned with liberty and necessity, that Cudworth held to be most 
urgent, and so the analysis of atheism forms (in the words of Cassirer) ‘a 
gigantic fragment’ that was simply part of a preamble towards the main 
task.17 In the opening lines of the Preface to the TIS Cudworth confesses 
that ‘when I engaged the press, I intended only a discourse concerning 
liberty and necessity, or, to speak out more plainly, against the fatal 
                                                        
16 See Cudworth’s Preface in TIS, as printed in Cudworth (1820), vol. 1, 47.  
17 Cassirer, The Platonic Renaissance in England, 42.  
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necessity of all actions and events’.18 While atheism and moral relativism 
are naturally just as pernicious as determinism to Cudworth, he is 
primarily concerned about the rise of determinism for it seems to him to 
lead inevitably on to the other two vices. Determinism, a doctrine 
sometimes thought to be compatible with Christian belief, in fact 
undermines our notions of praise and blame and so makes punishment, in 
the form of the day of judgement, redundant. Consequently it undermines 
both our morality and our fear of God. It is for these reasons that the battle 
between liberty and necessity stands as Cudworth’s principal philosophical 
concern.  
 
Although Cudworth only published the first part and never issued the 
second and third parts that would have dealt with morality and liberty, he 
left behind a substantial number of manuscripts, extracts of which were 
published posthumously. Drafts of material destined for the second part 
were published in 1731 as A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable 
Morality, while one of a number of manuscripts dealing with liberty and 
necessity now held in The British Library was published in 1838 as A 
Treatise of Freewill.19 So, although Cudworth never finished the TIS in the 
form that he intended, his three published philosophical works do give us a 
good sense of what it would have contained if it had been completed.  
 
The Refutation of Atheism  
 
In the work we know as the TIS, the task is to refute atheism. In order to 
deal with atheism, Cudworth’s method is to gather together the various                                                         
18 TIS Pref. ((1678), fol. A3 r.; (1820), vol. 1, 43).  
19 These two works can now be found in R. Cudworth, A Treatise Concerning Eternal and 
Immutable Morality with A Treatise of Freewill, edited by S. Hutton (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). The latter was edited out of MSS now held in the British Library 
(BL Addit. 4978-82), on which see Passmore, Ralph Cudworth, 110-13.  
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arguments for atheism that have been advanced throughout the history of 
philosophy and to refute them one by one. But as a consummate scholar, 
this method demands that Cudworth supply all of the existing arguments 
for atheism, properly documented, before turning to refute them. 
Ironically, what we find in the TIS is arguably the finest history of 
philosophical atheism ever written, a veritable textbook of atheism.20 In 
fact, some of his contemporaries came to a similar assessment, attacking 
him for stating the reasons in favour of atheism a little too clearly, as 
Shaftesbury noted in his attempt to defend Cudworth.21  
 
There is no question, however, that Cudworth might have been some form 
of atheist in disguise. While we might question the strict orthodoxy of 
Cudworth’s own theology there is little doubt that he was a devoted 
Christian. His entire philosophical project is directed towards combating 
contemporary forms of atheism and especially philosophies that combined 
atheism with determinism.22 His central target is probably Hobbes.23                                                         
20 Detailed philosophical responses have often proved counterproductive: Galen 
inadvertently preserved important information about Stoic psychology otherwise lost in 
his polemic against it in De Placiticis Hippocratis et Platonis, and John Philoponus did the 
same for Proclus in his Contra Proclum.  
21 See A. A. Cooper, Third Earl of Shatfesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, 
Times, edited by L. E. Klein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 264-5: ‘You 
know the common fate of those who dare to appear fair authors. What was that pious and 
learned man’s case who wrote The Intellectual System of the Universe? I confess it was 
pleasant enough to consider that, though the whole world were no less satisfied with his 
capacity and learning than with his sincerity in the cause of deity, yet was he accused of 
giving the upper hand to the atheists for having only stated their reasons and those of 
their adversaries fairly together.’ On the reception of Cudworth see R. L. Colie, Light and 
Enlightenment: A Study of the Cambridge Platonists and the Dutch Arminians (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1957), 117-44, and J. Redwood, Reason, Ridicule, and Religion: 
The Age of Enlightenment in England 1660-1750 (London: Thames and Hudson, 1976), 50-
60.  
22 Cudworth holds that these two doctrines naturally belong together, stating that ‘there 
can be nothing more absurd, than for an atheist to assert liberty of the will’ (TIS Pref. 
((1678), fol. *v.; (1820), vol. 1, 52), reading ‘than’ with the 1820 edition, in place of ‘then’ 
in the 1678 edition).  
23 On Cudworth’s treatment of Hobbes see Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan, 96-102, 126-
33; Y.-C. Zarka, ‘Critique de Hobbes et fondement de la morale chez Cudworth’, in The 
  10 
There is also a comment that might be taken as a reference to Spinoza, 
although he is not named.24 It is not clear how familiar Cudworth was with 
Spinoza’s philosophy. While the TIS was published a year after Spinoza’s 
1677 Opera Posthuma, the bulk of it was completed as early as 1671, but 
according to Nadler parts of Spinoza’s Ethica circulated in MS form as 
early as 1663 and a first draft was complete by 1665.25 Here was arguably 
another contemporary atheist but one quite different from Hobbes. 
However, Cudworth does not name any of these contemporary opponents 
and instead embarks upon a philological excavation of ancient forms of 
atheism. Cudworth’s view is that very few philosophical positions are 
completely new, and that every apparently novel philosophical idea usually 
has some ancestor. With this model of perennial philosophy in the 
background Cudworth takes on all and sundry contemporary forms of 
atheism via a complex taxonomy of the very earliest expressions of 
atheism. If Cudworth can show that contemporary atheists merely reinvent 
doctrines proven to be false long ago then his task is done.  
 
Cudworth proceeds, then, to collate and categorize ancient forms of 
atheism and it is within this context that we find his discussion of Stoicism. 
This classification begins by identifying two principal forms of atheism. 
The most notorious of these is atomical atheism. However, Cudworth, the                                                         
Cambridge Platonists in Philosophical Context, edited by G. A. J. Rogers, J. M. Vienne, and 
Y.-C. Zarka (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997), 39-52.  
24 For discussion see S. Hutton, ‘Reason and Revelation in the Cambridge Platonists, and 
their Reception of Spinoza’, in Spinoza in der Frühzeit seiner Religiösen Wirkung, edited by 
K. Gründer and W. Schmidt-Biggemann (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1984), 181-200, 
esp. 189-90. Whether or not Cudworth knew the contents of the Ethics, he certainly knew 
Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus as he quotes from it (TIS ch. 5 (1678) 707; (1820), 
vol. 3, 254). On Cudworth responding to Spinoza see J. Israel, Enlightenment Contested 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 446. For a wider discussion of Spinoza and the 
Cambridge Platonists see Colie, Light and Enlightenment. For Henry More’s response to 
Spinoza see A. Jacob, Henry More’s Refutation of Spinoza (Hildesheim: Olms, 1991). Note 
also TIS Pref. ((1678) fol. **r.; (1820), vol. 1, 56), where Cudworth alludes to a 
contemporary exponent of hylozoism about to be made public but in disguise.  
25 See S. Nadler, Spinoza: A Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 225.  
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atomical theist, is keen to show that atomism is not only compatible with 
theism but also that atomistic atheism is in fact merely a corruption of an 
earlier form of atomistic theism.  
 
The second principal form of atheism he calls hylozoical. While atomick 
atheism conceives matter as essentially inert, hylozoism attributes life to 
all matter as an essential property:  
 
One main difference betwixt these two forms of atheism is this, 
that the Atomical supposes all life whatsoever to be accidental, 
generable, and corruptible: but the Hylozoick admits of a 
certain natural or plastick life, essential and substantial, 
ingenerable and incorruptible.26  
 
While atomical atheism is naturally associated with the name of 
Democritus, hylozoick atheism is credited first to Strato, a Peripatetic 
philosopher and student of Theophrastus.27                                                          
26 TIS ch. 3 § 1 ((1678), 105; (1820), vol. 1, 234).  
27 The surviving evidence for Strato is collected together in F. Wehrli, Die Schule des 
Aristoteles, Texte und Kommentar: 5. Straton von Lampsakos (Basel & Stuttgart: Schwabe & 
Co, 1969). Strato has often been presented as pushing Aristotle’s philosophy towards 
materialism, although the fragmentary nature of the surviving evidence makes it difficult 
to determine precisely how much Strato deviated from Aristotle’s philosophy, if at all. On 
the topic of theology (i.e. potential fragments of his now lost Περὶ θεῶν), Wehrli lists 8 
fragments (fr. 32-9, on pp. 16-7). Cudworth cites 5 of these (and those that he omits add 
little more information; this is a sign of the quality of his scholarship): Cicero Academica 
II.121 (= fr. 32) ‘all existing things of whatever sort have been produced by natural 
causes’ (docet omnia effecta esse natura); De Natura Deorum I.35 (= fr. 33) ‘nature […] 
contains in itself the causes of birth, growth, and decay, but is entirely devoid of sensation 
and of form’ (natura […] quae causas gignendi augendi minuendi habeat sed careat omni et 
sensu et figura); Lactantius De Ira Dei X.1 (= fr. 34) ‘nature has in itself the power of 
production and of diminution, but that it has neither sensibility nor figure, so that we may 
understand that all things were produced spontaneously, without any artificer or author’ 
(naturam vero […] habere in se vim gignendi et minuendi, sed eam nec sensum habere ullum nec 
figuram, ut intelligamus omnia quasi sua sponte esse generata, nullo artifice nec auctore); Plutarch 
Adversus Colotem 1115b (= fr. 35) ‘the universe itself is not animate and nature is 
subsequent to chance’ (τε τὸν κόσμον αὐτὸν οὐ ζῷον εἶναί φησι, τὸ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν 
ἕπεσθαι τῷ κατὰ τύχην); Seneca (fr. 31 Haase) apud Augustine De Civitate Dei VI.10 (= fr. 
  12 
 
Cudworth’s taxonomy of atheism does not end here, however. The 
distinction between Atomical and Hylozoick atheism is fundamentally a 
distinction between dead and living matter but Cudworth goes on to argue 
that each of these broad categories contains within itself more than one 
type of atheism. The categories of Atomical and Hylozoick atheism are 
thus each subdivided to give us four principal types of atheism. To 
complicate matters a little Cudworth carries over the labels Atomical and 
Hylozoick to two of these four subtypes. Now, alongside Atomical atheism 
stands another form of atheism built upon a conception of dead matter and 
alongside Hylozoic atheism stands another form involving the notion of 
living matter.  
 
The first of these new types is Hylopathian or Anaximandrian atheism, 
after the Milesian Presocratic. Like Atomical or Democritical atheism this 
new type assumes matter to be dead. The difference between the two is 
that while Atomical atheism derives things or objects from the 
arrangement of atoms, Hylopathian atheism does so via qualities and 
forms.  
 
The second new type, the fourth and final type of atheism, Cudworth calls 
variously Spermatick or Cosmo-Plastick atheism and like Hylozoick 
atheism is built upon a conception of living matter. The difference between 
these two is that while Hylozoick atheism attributes a life principle or force 
to each material entity, Spermatick or Cosmo-Plastick atheism posits just 
one living principle animating all of the corporeal world. This principle is, 
                                                        
37) ‘suggested a god without a soul’ (fecit deum […] sine animo). On Strato’s presence in 
early modern philosophy, and perceived connections with Stoicism and Spinozism, see 
Israel, Enlightenment Contested, 444-57.  
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however, ‘without any sense or conscious understanding’.28 Cudworth 
illustrates this with a passage from Seneca’s Natural Questions (to which we 
shall return later) and goes on to claim that ‘we cannot trace the footsteps 
of this doctrine any where so much as among the Stoicks’, and so he labels 
it Stoical atheism.29  
 
We shall come back to the details of Cudworth’s reading of the Stoics 
shortly. By way of summary first, we now have four types of atheism, 
divided into two pairs according to their respective conceptions of matter, 
and each type associated with the name of an ancient philosopher or an 
ancient school. The Atomical, Hylopathian, Hylozoick, and Cosmo-
Plastick, are associated with Democritus, Anaximander, Strato, and the 
Stoics respectively.30 What all these forms of atheism share in common is 
corporealism; they admit no other substance beyond body or matter. 
Cudworth writes:  
 
all atheists are possessed with a certain kind of madness, that 
may be called pneumatophobia, that makes them have an 
irrational but desperate abhorrence from spirits or incorporeal 
substance, they being acted also, at the same time, with an 
hylomania, whereby they madly dote upon matter, and 
devoutly worship it, as the only numen.31  
 
In fact, perhaps the key characteristic of atheism for Cudworth is that:  
                                                         
28 TIS ch. 3 § 26 ((1678), 131; (1820), vol. 1, 285). The 1820 edition prints ‘of’ in place of 
‘or’.  
29 TIS ch. 3 § 28 ((1678), 133; (1820), vol. 1, 288).  
30 See the summary at TIS ch. 3 § 30 ((1678), 134-5; (1820), vol. 1, 292).  
31 TIS ch. 3 § 30 ((1678), 135; (1820), vol. 1, 293).  
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all animality, sense and consciousness, is a secondary, 
derivative and accidental thing, generable and corruptible, 
arising out of particular concretions of matter organized and 
dissolved together with them.32  
 
The essence of atheism, then, is the claim that consciousness is an 
emergent property. As he puts it elsewhere, all forms of atheism share the 
claim that all conscious life, all souls and minds, is generated out of matter 
or ‘educed out of nothing, and reduced into nothing’.33 Theism, by 
contrast, places animalish, sentient, and conscious nature as the first 
principle of the universe, in the form of God.  
 
The other characteristic that Cudworth attributes to all four types of 
atheism is a belief in the necessity of events (we already seen that 
determinism is Cudworth’s greatest concern), although he says that there 
are in fact two types of atheistic necessity. The Anaximandrians and 
Democritists posit a material necessity or absolute necessity, while the 
Stoics and Stratonists posit a plastic necessity or hypothetical necessity.34 
While the former can include fortune or chance, the latter is methodical 
and orderly.  
 
Although Cudworth does not explicitly rank these different forms of 
atheism there is a sense in which he is far more upset by the Stoic and 
Stratonic forms. While Democritical and Anaximandrian atheists may 
appear to be more thoroughgoing insofar as they deny the existence of any                                                         
32 TIS ch. 3 § 30 ((1678), 136; (1820), vol. 1, 295).  
33 TIS ch. 3 § 32 ((1678), 138; (1820), vol. 1, 298). For a discussion of the notion of 
consciousness (esp. self-consciousness) in Cudworth see U. Thiel, ‘Cudworth and 
Seventeenth-Century Theories of Consciousness’, in The Uses of Antiquity: The Scientific 
Revolution and the Classical Tradition, edited by S. Gaukroger (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991), 
79-99.  
34 See TIS ch. 3 § 33 ((1678) 138-9; (1820), vol. 1, 300).  
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principle of life within their dead matter, making both life and 
consciousness emergent properties, Cudworth qua Cartesian sees this 
mechanical view of nature the natural complement of theism, to the extent 
that this dead matter requires transcendent intervention to account for its 
motion. Stoic and Stratonic atheism, by contrast, have no need for a first 
cause for they have their own immanent principle of movement.  
 
Cudworth is by no means concerned by the fact he has so many different 
forms of atheism with which to contend. On the contrary, he is delighted 
that ‘the kingdom of darkness [is] divided, or labouring with an intestine 
seditious war in its own bowels, and thereby destroying itself’.35 The 
contradictory arguments put forward by each type of atheist may be 
redeployed against the other types so that they refute one another. Thus, 
‘atheism is a certain strange kind of monster, with four heads, that are all 
of them perpetually biting, tearing, and devouring one another’.36  
 
Cudworth’s taxonomy of philosophical positions does not end here, 
however. He goes on to suggest that each of these forms of atheism has a 
theistic counterpart. Thus we have not only Atomical atheism but also 
Atomical theism (his own position), and so on for the other types of 
atheism. Indeed, Cudworth goes on to suggest that atomism has a natural 
association with what he calls incorporeism, a natural association violently 
broken by Democritus, the first Atomical atheist. Before Democritus, 
atomism existed in its authentic form as a type of theism.37 The same                                                         
35 TIS ch. 3 § 34 ((1678), 142; (1820), vol. 1, 307).  
36 TIS ch. 3 § 34 ((1678) 143; (1820), vol. 1, 309).  
37 See TIS ch. 3 § 2 ((1678) 105; (1820), vol. 1, 234). The evidence for pre-Democritic (and 
Leucippic) atomism comes from the Stoic Posidonius, cited by Strabo, who credits the 
doctrine to Mochus of Sidon. See Strabo XVI.2.24 (= Posidonius fr. 285, in L. Edelstein 
and I. G. Kidd, Posidonius, The Fragments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972; 
second edition 1989), hereafter EK), with Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos IX.363 
(= Posidonius fr. 286 EK) and I. G. Kidd, Posidonius II: The Commentary, 2 vols 
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applies to each of the four types of atheism, which are also held to be 
corruptions of an earlier, authentic type of theism.38 Atheism, for 
Cudworth, is always a degneration or corruption.  
 
Stoic Theism and Atheism 
 
After this lengthy, but necessary, account of Cudworth’s wider project we 
are now in a position to turn to his account of Stoicism. We have seen that 
Stoicism forms one of the four principal types of atheism and we should 
now expect Cudworth to argue that there is a corresponding form of 
theism – Stoical theism – and that this theism is the authentic and 
uncorrupted version of the doctrine. He doesn’t dissapoint on either front.  
 
For Cudworth, Stoicism is one of the archetypal forms of atheism and yet 
this is also a corruption of a purer and earlier Stoic doctrine. He suggests 
that the founder of Stoicism, Zeno of Citium (but also Heraclitus, often 
cited as a source for Stoic physics, and Hippasus of Metapontus, an obscure                                                         
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), vol. 2, 971-5. Cudworth notes this at 
TIS ch. 1 §§ 9-10 ((1678), 12; (1820), vol. 1, 90-91), where he mentions the attempts by 
some to identify this Mochus with Moses. On this see G. Aspelin, Ralph Cudworth’s 
Interpretation of Greek Philosophy: A Study in the History of English Philosophical Ideas 
(Göteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1943), 19-22.  
38 Thus the counterpart to Anaximandrian atheism is Thales’ theism and the counterpart 
to Strato’s atheism is Aristotelian theism. See Aspelin, Ralph Cudworth’s Interpretation of 
Greek Philosophy, 25-8. Curdworth’s full taxonomy of forms of atheism and the 
corresponding theistic positions of which they are corruptions is thus:  
         Four Types of Atheism     Corresponding Theism  
         Atomical (Democritus)    Mochus  
    Atomical (i.e. dead matter) 
         Hylopathian (Anaximander)  Thales  
Atheism (i.e. corporealism) 
         Hylozoick (Strato)     Aristotle  
    Hylozoick (i.e. living matter) 
         Cosmoplastick (Stoic)    Stoic (esp. Zeno) 
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heterodox Pythagorean), thought the world to be an animal with a sentient 
and rational nature. As such he suggests that Zeno and the ‘most ancient 
Stoicks’ were not atheists at all, this being a later degeneracy from the 
original Stoic doctrine.39 Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, was not an atheist; 
rather he was a ‘corporeal theist’, albeit an ‘ignorant, childish, and unskilful 
theist’:40  
 
Heraclitus and Zeno […] are not accounted Atheists, because 
they supposed their fiery matter, to have not only life, but also 
a perfect understanding originally belonging to it, as also the 
whole world to be an animal.41  
 
Even though Zeno asserts that only bodies exist and that the whole of 
Nature is nothing but matter, if it is also an aminal with sentient or 
rational life then he should not be counted among the atheists. Instead, 
Cudworth calls his position one of corporeal cosmo-zoism, an example of 
corporeal theism, which is of course from Cudworth’s Christian perspective 
a type of spurious theism.42  
 
However, if Zeno had claimed that the whole of Nature was not conscious 
then he would have been an atheist, claiming that:  
 
the whole world is no animal, but as it were, one huge plant or 
vegetable, a body endued with one plastick or spermatick                                                         
39 See TIS ch. 3 § 28 ((1678), 133; (1820), vol. 1, 288-9).  
40 TIS ch. 3 § 30 ((1678) 136; (1820), vol. 1, 295).  
41 TIS ch. 3 § 12 ((1678), 113; (1820), vol. 1, 250). For the Stoic debt to Herclitus see A. A. 
Long, ‘Heraclitus and Stoicism’, Philosophia 5 (1975), 133-56 (and reprinted in his Stoic 
Studies, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996 / Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2001), 35-57).  
42 See TIS ch. 3 § 26 ((1678), 131-2; (1820), vol. 1, 286).  
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nature, branching out the whole, orderly and methodically, but 
without any understanding or sense. And this must needs be 
accounted a form of atheism, because it does not derive the 
original of things in the universe from any clearly intellectual 
principle or conscious nature.43  
 
Zeno did not claim this, though, and nor did a number of his immediate 
successors, the most significant of whom was Chrysippus.44 Diogenes 
Laertius informs us that:  
 
The doctrine that the cosmos is an animal, rational, animate, 
and intelligent, is laid down by Chrysippus in the first book of 
his treatise On Providence, by Apollodorus in his Physics, and by 
Posidonius. It is an animal in the sense of an animate substance 
endowed with sensation; for animal is better than non-animal, 
and nothing is better than the cosmos, ergo the cosmos is an 
animal. And it is endowed with soul, as is clear from our several 
souls being each a fragment of it.45  
                                                        
43 TIS ch. 3 § 26 ((1678), 132; (1820), vol. 1, 286).  
44 The fragments for Zeno and the other early Stoics are gathered together in H. von 
Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, 4 vols (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903-24), hereafter SVF. 
On Zeno’s theism see e.g. Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos IX.104 (= SVF 1.111), 
for the claim that the cosmos is an animal, and see also Arius Didymus fr. 29 (= SVF 
2.528). A string of passages on Zeno from Sextus and Cicero are in SVF 1.111-14. For an 
overview of Stoic theology see K. Algra, ‘Stoic Theology’, in The Cambridge Companion to 
The Stoics, edited by B. Inwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 153-78. 
For more detailed studies see M. Dragona-Monachou, The Stoic Arguments for the Existence 
and the Providence of the Gods (Athens: National and Capodistrian University of Athens, 
1976) and P. A. Meijer, Stoic Theology: Proofs for the Existence of the Cosmic God and of the 
Traditional Gods (Delft: Eburon, 2007).  
45 Diogenes Laertius VII.142-3 (= SVF 2.633, SVF 3.Apoll.10, Posidonius fr. 99a EK): Ὅτι 
δὲ καὶ ζῷον ὁ κόσμος καὶ λογικὸν καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ νοερὸν καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν πρώτῳ 
φησὶν Περὶ προνοίας καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος [φησιν] ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ καὶ Ποσειδώνιος· ζῷον μὲν 
οὕτως ὄντα, οὐσίαν ἔμψυχον αἰσθητικήν. τὸ γὰρ ζῷον τοῦ μὴ ζῴου κρεῖττον· οὐδὲν δὲ 
τοῦ κόσμου κρεῖττον· ζῷον ἄρ’ ὁ κόσμος. ἔμψυχον δέ, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς 
ἐκεῖθεν οὔσης ἀποσπάσματος. For commentary see Kidd, Posidonius II: The Commentary, 
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On Cudworth’s own terms, the most important of the early Stoics are 
clearly not atheists. Their cosmos is rational, ensouled, and intelligent 
(λογικὸν καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ νοερὸν). If their god is an animal, as it seems to 
be, then the Stoics are theists. Only if their god has merely vegetative life 
without consciousness – only if the Stoic god is a mindless vegetable – 
should Stoicism be classed as a type of atheism.  
 
So why did Cudworth associate one of his four principal types of atheism 
with Stoicism? Cudworth draws on two ancient pieces of evidence. The 
first is a passage from Seneca’s Natural Questions in which Seneca appears 
to waver between the competing claims that the world is either an animal 
or a vegetable:  
 
Whether the world is an animal, or a body governed by nature, 
like trees and plants, there is incorporated in it from its 
beginning to its end everything it must do or undergo.46  
 
Cudworth acknowledges that Seneca appears unwilling or unconcerned to 
choose between the two options, but this makes him all the more 
suspicious. He pushes this suspicion further by noting that some earlier 
scholars have also doubted whether Zeno really ever held the cosmos to be 
an animal, although he doesn’t name them.47 It should also be noted that 
Cudworth amends the text of Seneca in this passage: sive animal est mundus, 
‘whether the world is an animal’, is Cudworth’s own emendation of the                                                         
vol. 1, 403-6. The syllogism reported by Diogenes Laertius can also be found in Cicero, De 
Natura Deorum II.21 (= SVF 1.111). 
46 Seneca, Naturales Quaestiones III.29.2: Sive animal est mundus, sive corpus natura 
gubernabile, ut arbores, ut sata, ab initio eius usque ad exitum quicquid facere quicquid pati debeat, 
inclusum est.  
47 See TIS ch. 3 § 28 ((1678), 133; (1820), vol. 1, 288).  
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text, which the manuscript traditon records as sive anima est mundus, 
‘whether the world is a soul’. Although this might look as if Cudworth is 
amending the text to fit his own concerns, in fact the contrast he wants to 
make is clear in both readings, and a number of subsequent editors of the 
Natural Questions have adopted Cudworth’s reading.48  
 
Seneca’s indecision, suspicious as it may look, is hardly grounds on its own 
to cast the Stoics as one of the archetypal groups of ancient atheists. 
Cudworth’s second piece of evidence for Stoic atheism is more forthright. 
Earlier we saw Diogenes Laertius report that a whole series of important 
Stoics, including Chrysippus, Apollodorus, and Posidonius, all affirmed 
that the cosmos was indeed a rational, animate, and intelligent animal. The 
next line of Diogenes’ account adds that:  
 
Boethus, however, denies that the cosmos is an animal.49 
 
Boethus of Sidon was a relatively minor Stoic of the second century BC 
with heterodox views on a number of points of Stoic physical theory: he 
rejected the doctrine of periodic conflagration, posited the eternity and 
incorruptibility of the world, and denied that the world was an animal.50 
Cudworth, however, calls him                                                          
48 T. H. Corcoran notes in his Loeb Classical Library edition of the Naturales Questiones, 2 
vols (London: Heinemann, 1971-2) that animal was read by Koeler in his 1819 edition and 
Oltramere in his 1929 Budé edition, in place of anima in the MSS. In fact, Koeler was 
simply following Cudworth. H. Hine’s more recent critical edition of the Naturales 
Quaestiones records that while Cudworth proposes animal, the consensus of the MSS is 
indeed anima. See H. Hine, Seneca, Naturalium Quaestionum Libros (Stuttgart: Teubner, 
1996), 159.  
49 Diogenes Laertius VII.143 (= SVF 3.Boeth.6): Βόηθος δέ φησιν οὐκ εἶναι ζῷον τὸν 
κόσμον.  
50 Boethus of Sidon (teacher of Strabo), for whom there are 11 fragments in vol. 3 of SVF 
(of which the most substantial is in Philo, De Aeternitate Mundi 76-84). For an overview 
and further references see Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques: II Babélyca d’Argos à 
Dyscolius, edited by R. Goulet (Paris: CNRS, 1994), 123-5.  
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an eminent and famous Stoical Doctor [who] did plainly deny 
the world to be an animal, that is, to have any sentient, 
conscious or intellectual nature presiding over it, and [who] 
consequently must needs make it to be but […] a body 
governed by a plastick or vegetative nature, as trees, plants and 
herbs.51  
 
Cudworth goes on to claim, with no real grounds at all, that other Stoics 
may well have made this claim before Boethus, and that ‘it is very probable’ 
that Boethus had many followers. It is certainly doubtful that any Stoics 
before Boethus made this claim, as Diogenes’ report explicitly singles him 
out as the sole exponent of this heterodox view. Moreover, Cicero’s 
account of Stoic theology in De Natura Deorum, written in 45 BC, makes no 
mention of Boethus and repeats the standard Stoic argument reported by 
Diogenes that if there is rational mind in humans then there must surely be 
rational mind in Nature.52 Among later Stoics, Epictetus certainly does not 
follow Boethus’ lead and if anything goes the other way, embracing a more 
personalistic conception of god rather than reducing him to a mindless 
vegetable.53 In Cudworth’s defence, he does acknowledge that Boethus’ 
position, like all forms of atheism, is a corruption of a once theistic 
worldview and he labels this degenerate position ‘pseudo-Stoical’.54  
                                                         
51 TIS ch. 3 § 28 ((1678) 133-4; (1820), vol. 1, 290).  
52 See Cicero, De Natura Deorum II.18. At II.21-2 Cicero reports Zeno’s syllogisms in 
support of this claim.  
53 On Epictetus’ theology see K. Algra, ‘Epictetus and Stoic Theology’, in The Philosophy of 
Epictetus, edited by T. Scaltsas and A. S. Mason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
32-55, who acknowledges this personalistic element in Epictetus’ work but argues that 
ultimately he remains orthodox in his theology. Either way, there is no shift towards 
Boethus’ atheism.  
54 TIS ch. 3 § 28 ((1678), 134; (1820), vol. 1, 290).  
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Cudworth’s objection to this pseudo-Stoical atheism is that it reduces 
consciousness to an emergent property. The ancient sources don’t mention 
‘consciousness’ of course (and in fact Cudworth may have coined the 
English word in this very discussion), but they do mention sensation 
(αἴσθησις, distinguishing animals from plants and vegetables) and reason 
(λόγος, distinguishing humans from other animals). What Cudworth 
insists on is that:  
 
the sensitive souls of brute animals, and the rational souls of 
men, could never possibly emerge out of one single, plastick 
and vegetative soul in the whole universe.55  
 
On this point he is in complete agreement with the early Stoics and in 
particular with a series of theological arguments made by Zeno and 
reported by Cicero:  
 
Nothing that is inanimate and irrational can give birth to an 
animate and rational being; but the world gives birth to 
animate and rational beings; therefore the world is animate and 
rational.56  
 
So, despite branding Stoicism as one of the four principal types of atheism, 
Cudworth’s own position is in fact quite close to the orthodox Stoic view in 
rejecting the idea that sensation, intelligence, or consciousness might be an 
emergent property. This is not, however, to suggest that Cudworth held                                                         
55 TIS ch. 3 § 34 ((1678), 143; (1820), vol. 1, 309). The importance of this point for 
Cudworth is rightly emphasized by G. Giglioni, ‘The Cosmoplastic System of the 
Universe: Ralph Cudworth on Stoic Naturalism’, Revue d'histoire des sciences 61/2 (2008), 
313-31.  
56 Cicero, De Natura Deorum II.22 (= SVF 1.113): Nihil quod animi quodque rationis est 
expers, id generare ex se potest animantem conpotemque rationis; mundus autem generat animantis 
compotesque rationis; animas est igitur mundus composque rationis.  
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any secret sympathy for Stoicism; it simply reflects his wider commitment 




Cudworth’s aim behind his complete taxonomy of forms of atheism was not 
merely antiquarian. As we have already seen, his principal goal was to 
undermine contemporary forms of atheism, with Hobbes and Spinoza being 
the most likely targets.57 While Hobbes attracted a number of polemics,58 
and Hobbes and Spinoza were sometimes attacked together (by, among 
others, Samuel Clarke in his A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of 
God), it was Spinoza’s alleged atheism that would prove to have most 
consequences for the reception of Stoicism in the period after the 
publication of the TIS.  
 
What is striking about the reception of both Stoicism and Spinozism from 
the 1670s onwards is the way in which they are intertwined.59 The first 
author to pursue this line of thought was Jakob Thomasius, who published 
works on Stoicism in 1676 and 1682, and whose greatest claim to fame                                                         
57 To these we might add Francis Glisson author of The Life of Nature (i.e. the Tractatus de 
natura substantiae energetica, seu De vita Naturae, published in London, 1672), mentioned by 
Cudworth at TIS ch. 5 ((1678), 839; (1820), vol. 4, 92).  
58 See e.g. Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan.  
59 On this see e.g. Israel, Enlightenment Contested, 457-70; Brooke, ‘How the Stoics Became 
Atheists’. For discussions of the relationship between Stoicism and Spinoza see e.g. P. O. 
Kristeller, ‘Stoic and Neoplatonic Sources of Spinoza’s Ethics’, History of European Ideas 5 
(1984), 1-15; S. James, ‘Spinoza the Stoic’, in The Rise of Modern Philosophy, edited by T. 
Sorell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 289-316; A. Matheron, ‘Le moment stoicien de 
l’Éthique de Spinoza’, in Le stoïcisme au XVIe et au XVIIe siècle, edited by P.-F. Moreau 
(Paris: Albin Michel, 1999), 302-16; A. A. Long, ‘Stoicism in the Philosophical Tradition: 
Spinoza, Lipsius, Butler’, in The Cambridge Companion to The Stoics, edited by B. Inwood 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 365-92; F. DeBrebander, ‘Psychotherapy 
and Moral Perfection: Spinoza and the Stoics on the Prospect of Happiness’, in Stoicism: 
Traditions and Transformations, edited by S. K. Strange and J. Zupko (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 198-213; F. Debrebander, Spinoza and the Stoics 
(London: Continuum, 2007).  
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would be to have taught, and then corresponded with, Leibniz.60 It was 
developed by Johann Franz Buddeus who, in a book on Spinozism before 
Spinoza, claimed that the Stoics were, among all the Greek philosophers, 
the closest to Spinozism.61 We see the same claim crop up in other authors 
of the period, such as Vico and Bayle. Vico, for instance, describes the 
Stoics as ‘the Spinozists of their day’.62 The same conjunction can be found 
later in the eighteenth century in the Encyclopédie: the article on Spinoza 
opens by contrasting Spinoza’s philosophy with Epicurus and Strato before 
identifying it with Stoicism. The only significant difference between 
Stoicism and Spinozism, the article’s author suggests, is Spinoza’s rejection 
of providence.63  
 
Despite this later tradition of identifying Stoicism with both Spinozism and 
atheism one thing is hopefully clear, namely that while Stoicism may not 
be easily assimilated to Christianity, it is not straightforwardly a form of 
atheism either. Cudworth is the only author of this period to offer a 
thorough analysis of these issues with clear definitions and conditions for 
what it means to be a theist or an atheist. Despite the reputation as atheists 
that the Stoics acquired in the eighteenth century, Cudworth shows well 
before that tradition even became established that it is mistaken, even if he 
may have contributed to its developoment himself. According to his 
definitions of theism and atheism the orthodox early Stoics remain theists,                                                         
60 See J. Thomasius, Exercitatio de Stoica Mundi Exustione (Leipzig, 1676), 166-76, and 
Dissertationes ad Stoicae Philosophiae (Leipzig, 1682), 14-15, 22, 35. For an overview of 
these works see G. Santinello (ed.), Models of the History of Philosophy I: From Its Origins in 
the Renaissance to the ‘Historia Philosophica’ (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993), 409-42. On his 
correspondence with Leibniz see C. Mercer, ‘Leibniz and His Master: The 
Correspondence with Jakob Thomasius’, in Leibniz and His Correspondents , edited by P. 
Lodge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 10-46.  
61 See J. F. Buddeus, De Spinozismo ante Spinozam, §§ 18-19, in his Analecta Historiae 
Philosophicae (Halae Saxonum, 1724), 340-44.  
62 See G. Vico, The New Science, translated by T. G. Bergin and M. H. Fisch (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1984), 98.  
63 See Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire Raisonné des Sciences, des Arts et des Métiers, vol. 15, 474.  
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even if their theism is far from orthodox Christianity, because their god is 
sentient. For the orthodox Stoa consciousness is not an emergent property 
for that would imply that a part might have greater perfection than the 




64 An earlier version of this paper was read at the Oxford Seminar in Early Modern 
Philosophy in October 2008. I should like to thank Paul Lodge for the opportunity to speak 
and the participants for their various comments. I should also like to thank two 
anonymous reviewers for the journal who made a number of suggestions and saved me 
from some errors. I remain all too responsible for not following their advice at certain 
points.  
